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LIMITING SPILLOVER AND FORECLOSURE THROUGH
TITLE III OF THE EXPORT TRADING COMPANY ACT OF
1982
INTRODUCrION
The United States export market is critical to the domestic econ-
omy.' When exports lag behind imports, inflation increases domesti-
cally2 and the value of the dollar declines internationally. 3 Currently,
thousands of American businesses produce exportable goods, but are
unable to compete with foreign companies in international markets. 4
Historically, business has contended that the underlying reason for the
problems of American exporters in international markets is the uncer-
tain jurisdictional scope of United States antitrust law. 5  Businesses
engaging in export activities face numerous antitrust problems. For
example, if several manufacturers want to export products jointly to
1. See 15 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (1982). Exports create and maintain "one out of
every nine manufacturing jobs in the United States and ... generat[e] one out of
every seven dollars of total United States goods produced." Id. § 4001(a)(1); see H.R.
Rep. No. 924, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. 2 (Conf. Report 1982) [hereinafter cited as
Conference Report]; 128 Cong. Rec. H8460 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982) (statement of
Rep. Bingham).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 4001(a)(3) (1982).
3. Id. The ratio of exports to GNP rose from 4.2% in 1972 to 7.5% in 1979;
however, United States imports increased in importance relative to the GNP from
5.1% to 8.7% in the same years. S. Rep. No. 27, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Senate Report]. The trade deficit has expanded dramatically
with an aggregate deficit over the past five years exceeding $140 billion. Id.
4. See 15 U.S.C. § 4001(a)(4) (1982). One of the primary reasons for the
inability of American exporters to compete successfully against foreign competitors is
that they "do not have sufficient expertise to penetrate the wide variety of foreign
markets." 128 Cong. Rec. H8461 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982) (statement of Rep.
Bingham). Export trading companies "can provide a real service to American manu-
facturers and distributors who are not otherwise able fully to explore and meet
foreign market demands." Id.
5. See Senate Report, supra note 3, at 7 (lack of American exports is due to the
lack of clear-cut antitrust immunity for export activity); International Economic
Affairs Department, National Association of Manufacturers, The International Im-
plications of U.S. Antitrust Laws 4 (1974) (70% of firms reporting claimed that
United States antitrust policy decreased their ability to compete against foreign
competitors).
The Second Circuit, in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416
(2d Cir. 1945), analyzed the jurisdictional scope of United States antitrust law in
terms of an "effects" test: foreign conduct that is intended to affect United States
commerce, and does so, comes within the purview of United States antitrust law. Id.
at 443-44. Federal courts subsequently have modified this test in various ways. For
example, jurisdiction has been found when conduct has "a substantial effect on
American foreign commerce," Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595
F.2d 1287, 1292 (3d Cir. 1979), "directly affect[s] the flow of foreign commerce into
or out of the country," Todhunter-Mitchell & Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 383 F.
Supp. 586, 587 (E.D. Pa.), modified on other grounds, 383 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Pa.
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foreign markets and to exchange information for this purpose, the
exchange of information may be considered an antitrust violation
because it could affect domestic prices-a spillover effect. 6 Addition-
ally, if an American exporter appoints an exclusive foreign distributor,
this exclusivity agreement may be considered an antitrust violation
because it could foreclose the export opportunities of other domestic
competitors-a foreclosure effect. 7  In 1982, Congress enacted the
Export Trading Company Act (ETCA)8 in order to clarify the extra-
territorial application of United States antitrust law9 and to aid the
export efforts of American business. 10 Congress determined that if
1974), creates "any appreciable anticompetitive effects on United States commerce,"
National Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 1980-81 Trade Cas. (CCH)
63,836, at 78,472 (2d Cir. 1981), has an "impact upon United States commerce,"
Industria Siciliana Asfalti, Bitumi, S.p.A. v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 1977-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,256, at 70,784 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), or has an effect that "is not
de minimis," Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 473 F. Supp.
680, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). A recent formulation of the extraterritorial reach of
United States antitrust law involves applying principles of international comity.
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 613, 615 (9th Cir. 1976).
The court in Timberlane established a three-part "balancing test" for jurisdiction:
the activity must have some actual or intended effect on United States foreign
commerce, id. at 613, the effect must be sufficiently great to present a cognizable
injury to the plaintiff, id., and the interest of the United States must be "sufficiently
strong, vis-h-vis those of other nations, to justify an assertion of extraterritorial
authority." Id.
6. See infra notes 61-118 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 119-179 and accompanying text.
8. Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1233 (1982) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6a, 4001-
03, 4016-21 (1982)).
9. See H.R. Rep. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-11 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
House Report]; Guidelines for the Issuance of Export Trade Certificates of Review,
48 Fed. Reg. 15,937 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Certificate Guidelines]. Testimony
before congressional committees emphasized that a primary concern of exporters was
the possibility that their joint exporting ventures would constitute an antitrust viola-
tion under the Sherman Act. See Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, Hear-
ings on H.R. 2326 before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the
House Comm. on the judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1981) (statement of James
R. Atwood, Esq.) ("The vitality and profitability of U.S. export trade can easily
suffer from the dampening effects of the uncertainty of current law."). For a detailed
discussion of the legislative history of the ETCA, see Bruce & Peirce, Understanding
the Export Trading Company Act & Using (or Avoiding) its Antitrust Exemptions, 38
Bus. Law. 975 (1983); Golden & Kolb, The Export Trading Company Act of 1982:
An American Response to Foreign Competition, 58 Notre Dame L. Rev. 743 (1983);
Reinsh, The Export Trading Company Act of 1981, 14 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 47
(1982); Unkovic & La Mont, The Export Trading Company Act of 1982 : Invitation
to Aggressive Export Expansion, 87 Dick. L. Rev. 205 (1983), Zarin, The Export
Trading Company Act: Reducing the Uncertainty in Export Trade, 17 Geo. Wash. J.
Int'l L. & Econ. 297 (1983).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 4001(b) (1982). The primary objective of title III is to increase
United States exports of products and services through the formation of export trade
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American companies could join together and combine their resources
without fear of violating antitrust laws, they would be able to export
more effectively, thus helping the United States economy." Title 11112
and title IV 13 of the ETCA, therefore, attempt to clarify the jurisdic-
tional scope of the antitrust laws in international transactions. These
provisions, however, utilize different approaches to reach this goal.
Title IV amends the Sherman Act14 and the Federal Trade Commision
Act 5 by providing that the antitrust laws apply to export conduct only
if such conduct has a "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable
effect" on domestic or import conduct or on the export conduct of a
domestic competitor.'
By contrast, title III of the Act establishes a certification procedure
administered by the Commerce Department 7 in conjunction with the
associations and export trading companies that will be able to provide export trade
services efficiently to United States producers and suppliers. Id.; see Conference
Report, supra note 1, at 4; House Report, supra note 9, at 2; 127 Cong Rec. S256
(daily ed. Jan. 19, 1981) (statement of Sen. Heinz).
11. See 15 U.S.C. § 4001(a)(5)-(6), (7) (1982). The Senate Committee on Bank-
ing, Housing, and Urban Affairs placed primary emphasis on aiding the development
of trading companies. Senate Report, supra note 3, at 5. The Committee concluded
that such companies, "by diversifying trade risk and developing economies of scale in
marketing, financing, and other export trade service, can do the exporting for large
numbers of U.S. producers." Id.; see H.R. Rep. No. 637, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 11
(1982); 127 Cong. Rec. S256 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1981) (statement of Sen. Heinz).
12. Pub. L. No. 97-290, tit. III, 96 Stat. 1233, 1240 (1982) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 4011-4021 (1982)).
13. Pub. L. No. 97-290, tit. IV, 96 Stat. 1233, 1246 (1982) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 6a (1982)).
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
15. Id. §§ 41-77 (1982).
16. Id. §§ 6a, 45(a)(3). Section 6a of the Sherman Act provides:
Sections 1 to 7 of this title shall not apply to conduct involving trade or
commerce (other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign
nations unless-
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably forseeable
effect-
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign
nations, or on import trade or import commerce with foreign nations, or
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a
person engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States; and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of [this Act], other
than this section.
Id. § 6a.
17. Id. § 4011. The fact that title III is administered by both the Commerce and
Justice Departments represents a compromise. The House placed the certification
procedure in the Justice Department. 128 Cong. Rec. H8463 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982)
(statement of Rep. McClory). The compromise agreement, however, placed the
procedure in the Department of Commerce and retained veto power in the Depart-
ment of Justice. Id.
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Justice Department, that immunizes specified export trade, 18 export
trade activities 19 and methods of operation20 from United States anti-
trust laws. The Commerce and Justice Departments pre-screen a
proposed export arrangement for any antitrust violations. 2 1 Certifica-
tion of such conduct is permitted when the exporter establishes that
the conduct will not restrain trade,2 2 unreasonably affect domestic
prices,2 3 constitute an unfair method of competition,2 4 or result in the
resale of the goods within the United States.2 5 The standards of title
III "encompass the full range of the antitrust laws."12 6 Thus, only
conduct that is lawful under current antitrust laws as amended by
title IV will be certified. Certification, therefore, promotes export
activity by assuring that business will not be subject to either govern-
ment prosecutions or private actions. 7
Title III standards are designed to provide an objective method of
determining whether export conduct is legal.28 Nonetheless, the broad
statutory language is capable of numerous interpretations.29 While the
18. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 4013, 4016 (1982). Export trade is defined as "trade or
commerce in goods, wares, merchandise, or services exported, or in the course of
being exported from the United States or any territory thereof to any foreign nation."
Id. § 4021(l).
19. See id. §§ 4013, 4016. Export trade activities are defined as "activities or
agreements in the course of export trade." Id. § 4021(3).
20. Id. §§ 4013, 4016. Methods of operation are defined as "any method by
which a person conducts or proposes to conduct export trade." Id. § 4021(4).
21. See id. § 4012(b)(2).
22. Id. § 4013(a)(1).
23. Id. § 4013(a)(2).
24. Id. § 4013(a)(3).
25. Id. § 4013(a)(4).
26. Conference Report, supra note 1, at 26. The Guidelines state that "[t]hese
certification standards are intended to encompass the substantive law of antitrust as
modified by the Webb-Pomerene Act." Certificate Guidelines, supra note 9, at
15,939 (footnote omitted).
27. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4016(a), (b)(1) (1982).
28. Title III deals directly with the problem of uncertainty by permitting anti-
trust immunity that is limited in scope to what is specified in the certificate, "thereby
providing business with a greater degree of certainty." Senate Report, supra note 3,
at 19.
29. The Commerce Department's interpretive Guidelines for the Issuance of
Export Trade Certificates of Review were issued "[t]o promote greater certainty
regarding the application of the antitrust laws to export trade." Certificate Guide-
lines, supra note 9, at 15,937 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 4017(a) (1982)). The Certificate
Guidelines discuss the requirements for eligibility, the standards for certification,
and the analytical approach that the Commerce and Justice Departments will utilize
in determining whether to issue a certificate. Id. at 15,937. When title III was first
passed, various interpretations of the legislation were viable constructions of the
statutory language. See, e.g., Bruce & Peirce, supra note 9, at 998-99; Zarin, supra
note 9, at 349-50. Some of the debate has become moot since the Certificate Guide-
lines were issued. For example, the Guidelines reject the argument that the "unfair
methods of competition" standard should be interpreted according to Federal Trade
Commission Act precedents. Certificate Guidelines, supra note 9, at 15,939. See
13031984]
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title III Guidelines for the Issuance of Export Trade Certificates of
Review (Guidelines) clarify the statutory language, 30 they raise other
antitrust problems, such as spillover and foreclosure, without resolv-
ing them.3' Since the passage of title III, the Commerce Department
has issued only fifteen certificates. 32 Apparently, most exporters have
chosen to rely on title IV's clarification of the jurisdictional scope of
United States antitrust law rather than opt for the certainty of title III
certification. 33 Because the export conduct certified under title III
infra note 136. For a more detailed analysis of the Guidelines, see Address of Eleanor
Roberts Lewis, Ass't Gen. Counsel for the United States Dep't of Commerce, World
Trade Institute Seminar on the Export Trading Companies Act of 1982 13-14 (avail-
able in files of Fordham Law Review) (May 1983) [hereinafter cited as Lewis].
30. See Certificate Guidelines, supra note 9, at 15,939.
31. See id.
32. Export Trade Certificate of Review for Farmers' Rice Coop., Applic. No. 84-
00005 (Mar. 12, 1984); Export Trade Certificate of Review for VEXTRAC, Ltd.,
Applic. No. 83-00036 (Mar. 6, 1984); Export Trade Certificate of Review for United
Export Trading Ass'n (UETA), Applic. No. 83-00023 (Feb. 21, 1984); Export Trade
Certificate of Review for TWP Co., Inc., Applic. No. 83-00030 (Feb. 8, 1984);
Export Trade Certificate of Review for U.S. Export & Trading Co. (USEX), Applic.
No. 83-00024 (Dec. 23, 1983); Export Trade Certificate of Review for Barlar Int'l,
Inc., Applic. No. 83-00020 (Dec. 9, 1983); Export Trade Certificate of Review for
Texas First Intercontinental Trading Co., Applic. No. 83-00019 (Dec. 7, 1983);
Export Trade Certificate of Review for Universal Trading Group Ltd. (UTG),
Applic. No. 83-00005 (Nov. 28, 1983); Export Trade Certificate of Review for Trade
Dev. Corp. of Chicago (TDCC), Applic. No. 83-0012 (Nov. 23, 1983); Export Trade
Certificate of Review for Int'l Trailer Sales, Inc. (ITS), Applic. No. 83-00009 (Nov.
15, 1983); Export Trade Certificate of Review for DMT World Trade, Inc., Applic.
No. 83-00016 (Nov. 4, 1983); Export Trade Certificate of Review for Int'l Dev. Inst.
(IDI), Applic. No. 83-00001 (Nov. 4, 1983); Export Trade Certificate for Mktg. &
Procurement Servs. Inc. (IMPS), Applic. No. 83-00002 (Oct. 25, 1983); Export Trade
Certificate of Review for U.S. Farm-Raised Fish Trading Co., Inc. (Catfish), Applic.
No. 83-00004 (Oct. 25, 1983); Export Trade Certificate of Review for Intex Int'l
Trading Co., Inc., Applic. No. 83-00008 (Oct. 25, 1983). Statistics were compiled in
March 1984.
33. There are several reasons why an exporter would choose not to apply for a
certificate. For example, there is a built-in time lag in the certification process. The
earliest that a certificate can be issued is thirty days from publication of the applica-
tion in the Federal Register. 15 U.S.C. § 4013(c) (1982). The more typical time
frame, however, is ninety days from the date that the application is deemed submit-
ted, which is the statutory deadline. Id. § 4013(b). Furthermore, exporters will have
the expense of legal costs incurred in the preparation of the application and drafting
of the certificate. Address by Irving P. Margulies, Acting Gen. Counsel for the U.S.
Dep't of Commerce, World Trade Institute Seminar on Advanced International
Antitrust, at 7 (Dec., 5-6, 1983) (available in files of Fordham Law Review) [herein-
after cited as Margulies]. Moreover, the terms of the certificate may not be flexible
enough for an exporter to deal with unforeseen market changes. See Hawk, Interna-
tional Antitrust Policy and the 1982 Acts: The Continuing Need for Reassessment, 51
Fordham L. Rev. 201, 218 (1982). Many potential certificate applicants have indi-
cated an unwillingness to apply because of the concern that confidential business
information will be disclosed, causing the exporter competitive harm. Lewis, supra
note 29, at 17.
EXPORT TRADING COMPANY ACT
constitutes legal conduct under title IV,34 a close examination of the
certificates will enable exporters not certified under title III to better
evaluate the legality of their export conduct.
This Note examines the certificates issued under title III and the
manner in which the Justice Department and the Commerce Depart-
ment have dealt with the problems of spillover and foreclosure. Part I
gives a broad overview of title III and title IV and examines the
manner in which a certificate is obtained under title III. Parts II and
III examine the problems of spillover and foreclosure in domestic
competition and analyze the ways in which the Justice Department
and the Commerce Department have attempted to minimize such
problems. The Note concludes that title III has caused a reexamina-
tion and reevaluation of spillover and foreclosure in the context of
international trade and that the title III certificates may be a valuable
tool in determining the antitrust concerns of the Justice Department.
Non-certified exporters who are relying solely on the jurisdictional
clarification of title IV should use the certificates as a guide in struc-
turing their conduct.
I. TITLE III AND TrrLE IV OF THE EXPORT TRADING COMPANY AcT
Title III of the ETCA establishes a legally binding preclearance
certification procedure 35 under which both individuals36 and busi-
nesses can obtain certificates that provide immunity from antitrust
suits for specified export trade, export trade activities and methods of
operation.3 7 The primary objective of title III is "to increase United
States exports of products and services by encouraging more efficient
provision of export trade services to United States producers and
suppliers." 38
34. See Certificate Guidelines, supra note 9, at 15,939.
35. Id. at 15,937. The major benefit of obtaining title III certification is that a
certificate delineates the limits of antitrust liability before an exporter begins to
export. See infra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
36. Title III allows any "person" who is engaged in export trade to apply for a
certificate. See 15 U.S.C. § 4011 (1982). The term "person" is defined as follows:
individual who is a resident of the United States; a partnership that is
created under and exists pursuant to the laws of any State or of the United
States; a State or local government entity; a corporation, whether organized
as a profit or nonprofit corporation, that is created under and exists pursu-
ant to the laws of any State or of the United States; or any association or
combination, by contract or other arrangement, between or among such
persons.
Id. § 4021(5).
The Guidelines state that a certificate may be granted to an entity that conducts
export trade as even a small part of its overall business. Certificate Guidelines, supra
note 9, at 15,938. United States subsidiaries of foreign companies and foreign com-
panies that are members of a United States trading entity are also eligible. Id.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 4013(a) (1982).
38. Id. § 4001(b).
1984] 1305
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
The threshold issue in determining whether the Commerce Depart-
ment will issue a title III certificate is whether the conduct proposed
falls within the export conduct eligible for certification.3 9 Definitions
of what constitutes export trade, export trade activities, and methods
of operation are provided in the statute.40 The broad interpretive
Guidelines for title III, however, establish that the types of export
conduct eligible for certification encompass more than a reading of
the statute would suggest. 41 For example, while the statute appears to
require that the goods to be exported must be produced in the United
States,42 the Guidelines state that such goods may be produced else-
where. 43 Furthermore, the statute requires that the goods must be "in
the course of being exported, ' 44 while the Guidelines state that the
goods do not actually have to be exported to fall within the scope of
the statute.45
39. See Certificate Guidelines, supra note 9, at 15,938.
40. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
41. The Guidelines clarify much of the initial uncertainty about how broadly the
term "export trade" may be construed. The Guidelines state that while the definition
is similar to the definition in the Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1982); see
Certificate Guidelines, supra note 9, at 15,938, export trade in title III also includes
the export of services. Id. at 15,938; 15 U.S.C. § 4021 (1982). The term "service" is
defined as "intangible economic output, including, but not limited to-(A) business,
repair, and amusement services, (B) management, legal, engineering, architectural,
and other professional services, and (C) financial, insurance, transportation, infor-
mational and any other data-based services, and communication services." Id. The
Guidelines further define the parameters of services to include patent, trademark,
know-how and technology licensing of persons located in other countries. Certificate
Guidelines, supra note 9, at 15,938 n.9. The Guidelines indicate that proposed export
conduct will be judged in a flexible manner. See id. at 15,938-39. For example, it is
not important for eligibility purposes whether the proposed conduct is characterized
as an export trade activity or a method of operation. Id. at 15,938. Examples of
export trade activities include "the sale and shipment of goods or services abroad,
advertising in the export market, international market research, product research
and design, joint trade promotion, financing, communication and processing of
foreign orders, and negotiating export contracts with foreign buyers." Id. Methods of
operation listed include the use of exclusive foreign distributors, id., the use of resale
price maintenance for foreign sales, id. at 15,939, the disclosure or exchange of
information between members and/or nonmembers, id., the sale of goods or services
on consignment, id. at 15,938, and the restriction of activities of members to export
markets. Id. at 15,939.
42. See 15 U.S.C. § 4021(1) (1982).
43. Certificate Guidelines, supra note 9, at 15,938.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 4021(1) (1982).
45. Certificate Guidelines, supra note 9, at 15,938. Thus, the sale of a product
within the United States that is ultimately destined for export may constitute "export
trade." Id. The production of goods in the United States, however, will not ordinar-
ily be considered "export trade" even if the goods are destined for export. Id.
One further clarification concerns overseas investment activity. Investments that
are an integral part of the export of goods and service may be certifiable. Id. at
15,939. The Guidelines provide two examples of overseas investment that may be
eligible for certification: investment in warehouse facilities overseas to store exported
1306 [Vol. 52
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Under the title III statutory standards, an exporter will be issued a
certificate of review if it can establish that its activity will:
(1) result in neither a substantial lessening of competition or re-
straint of trade within the United States nor a substantial restraint
of the export trade of any competitor of the applicant,
(2) not unreasonably enhance, stabilize, or depress prices within
the United States of the goods, wares, merchandise, or services of
the class exported by the applicant,
(3) not constitute unfair methods of competition against competi-
tors engaged in the export of goods, wares, merchandise, or services
of the class exported by the applicant, and
(4) not include any act that may reasonably be expected to result in
the sale for consumption or resale within the United States of the
goods, wares, merchandise, or services exported by the applicant. 46
The title III certification procedure attempts to strike a balance
between a desire to protect the domestic market and domestic compet-
itors from anticompetitive conduct and a desire to increase exports. 47
products until such products are transferred to a foreign purchaser, and minor
product or packaging modification activities necessary to comply with foreign mar-
ket requirements. Id.
The Guidelines are clearly an attempt by both the Commerce and Justice Depart-
ments to encourage trade by maximizing the scope of the exemption within the limits
of the antitrust laws. The Assistant General Counsel for Export Trading Companies
has suggested that exporters "be creative in construing 'export conduct."' Lewis,
supra note 29, at 9. For example, a literal interpretation of the fourth standard of
title III, 15 U.S.C. § 4013(a)(4) (1982), precludes importing any of the goods or
services exported under the certificate. Id. Such an interpretation may result in
substantial difficulties because it precludes importing into the United States products
made from component parts that had originally been exported from the United States
and assembled overseas. Lewis, supra note 29, at 15-16. Goods manufactured under
licensing agreements may also be precluded from reentry. Id. Thus, antitrust prob-
lems may arise because more competitive products would be prevented from entering
the United States, resulting in an anticompetitive effect on American markets. Id.
These potential problems, however, are eliminated by the rejection of a literal
approach in the Guidelines and by the adoption of a statutory construction that
focuses on the purpose of the standard, which is to "ensure that the anticompetive
effects, if any, of proposed export conduct [do] not have a domestic impact through
the export and subsequent re-import of the goods or services back into the United
States." Certificate Guidelines, supra note 9, at 15,940. The Guidelines establish two
requirements: (1) did the exporter reasonably expect that the exported goods or
services would reenter the United States for sale or consumption, and (2) would the
sale have a significant domestic impact. Id. at 15,940.
46. 15 U.S.C. § 4013(a)(1)-(4) (1982).
47. 128 Cong. Rec. H8459 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982) (statement of Rep. Brooks)
("[T]he certification procedure ... is a balanced one. It includes protection for the
certified exporter . . . but it also protects competitors and consumers from injury
caused by anticompetitive conduct.")
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Title III encourages cooperation between potential and actual com-
petitors48 and provides a mechanism by which small and medium-
sized American businesses can decrease the costs of exporting and
compete with foreign competitors.4 9 At the same time, the standards
limit cooperative activities to the export market in order to avoid
conduct adversely affecting American competitors.3 0
Title III encourages exporters to disclose their activities by protect-
ing the certificate holder and any members identified in the certificate
from private treble damage actions5' and from government criminal
and civil suits under state and federal antitrust laws. 52 A private cause
of action can be prosecuted successfully only if the Commerce and
Justice Departments have incorrectly issued the certificate.5 3 Immu-
nity from government prosecution extends to export conduct that is
specified in the certificates and that is carried out during the effective
period of the certificate.54
By contrast, title IV is an amendment to the Sherman Act and the
Federal Trade Commission Act providing that unless conduct involv-
ing trade or commerce, other than import trade or import commerce,
has a "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on do-
mestic competition or domestic competitors, United States antitrust
laws do not apply.55 The threshold requirement of title IV does not
take into consideration nationality or territoriality principles.58 By
48. Senate Report, supra note 3, at 4.
49. See 15 U.S.C. § 4001(a)(7) (1982).
50. Conference Report, supra note 1, at 1; see Certificate Guidelines, supra note
9, at 15,939.
51. 15 U.S.C. § 4016(a) (1982).
52. Id. § 4016(b)(1).
53. See id. § 4016(a). The Commerce and Justice Departments may incorrectly
issue a certificate by improperly applying the four statutory eligibility standards. Id.
§ 4014(b)(1). In addition, after the issuance of a certificate, the certified conduct may
no longer meet the eligibility standards because of changed circumstances. Id.
§§ 4014(b)(2), 4016(a) (conduct must meet eligibility standards to maintain immu-
nity). Only one certificate issued thus far requires the filing of an annual report. See
Export Trade Certificate of Review for United Export Trading Ass'n (UETA), Ap-
plic. No. 83-00023, at 6-7 (Feb. 21, 1984). This report must contain the company's
total annual domestic and export sales information. Id. The report may be used to
verify that the circumstances under which the certificate was issued have not sub-
stantially changed. See Address by C.W. Conrath, Ass't Chief, Foreign Commerce
Section, Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Early Experience Under the Export
Trading Company Act of 1982 before the Pa. Bar Institute (Nov. 2, 1983), at 12
(available in files of Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Conrath].
54. There is no statutory time limit on the effectiveness of a certificate. Lewis,
supra note 29, at 6. Certificates remain effective until they are revoked or modified
in acordance with title III. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 4014, 4016 (1982).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1) (1982).
56. House Report, supra note 9, at 9-10.
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eliminating some of the confusion and uncertainty arising from recent
case law, the goal of title IV is to create a uniform standard applicable
to export transactions that will provide more concrete guidance to
counsel and clients.5 7
Under title IV of the ETCA, United States exporters may now
engage in restrictive export business practices that were previously
prohibited, as long as the effects of these practices are limited to
foreign markets.58 The jurisdictional threshold of title IV is met,
however, if the effects of export conduct are not so limited.59 For
example, if in the process of implementing export sales, domestic
competitors share cost or price information relating to their United
States sales, the potential spillover effect in the domestic market may
result in antitrust liability under the Sherman Act.6 0 The Commerce
and Justice Departments, interpreting current antitrust law, have
recognized the dangers of spillover and foreclosure and have struc-
tured the title III certificates to limit the conduct of exporters, thus
avoiding the risk of anticompetitive behavior. 1 Accordingly, an ex-
amination of the certificates should assist the uncertified exporter in
determining what conduct will meet the jurisdictional requirements
of title IV.
II. THE SPILLOVER EFFECT: COLLUSION AMONG EXPORTERS
Joint activity in an export market may diminish or eliminate com-
petition in a domestic market. This may occur either directly, by using
exchanges of business information as a forum for discussion and agree-
ment on output or sales policies,62 or indirectly, by regulating export
57. Id. at 2; Golden & Kolb, supra note 9, at 783.
58. Bruce & Peirce, supra note 9, at 983-84. Title IV may allow firms to engage
in conduct in export markets that if engaged in domestically would constitute an
antitrust violation. Id. For example, United States exporters will have more freedom
to form cartels, as long as there is no effect on domestic commerce. Id. "[A] price-
fixing conspiracy, directed solely to exported products or services, absent a spillover
effect on the domestic marketplace ... would normally not have the requisite effects
on domestic or import commerce." House Report, supra note 9, at 10.
59. See 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1)(B) (1982).
60. A restraint that adversely affects domestic competitors by foreclosing their
export opportunities is a sufficient predicate for title IV jurisdiction. B. Hawk,
United States, Common Market & International Antitrust: A Comparative Guide 45(1979). For example, "an agreement among United States manufacturers to pool
foreign patents [would] prevent United States manufacturers from exporting to those
countries covered by the patents." Id.
61. See infra notes 92-118, 154-79 and accompanying text.
62. 1 J. Atwood & K. Brewster, Antitrust and American Business Abroad § 9.08,
at 287-88 (2d ed. 1981); see United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S.
422, 441 (1978); United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969);
Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 567 (1925); American
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sales that can lessen domestic competition and artificially maintain
domestic prices .63 Any drastic change in the volume of United States
exports, therefore, may spill over into the domestic market by creating
a surplus, shortage or price disruption.6 4 Such effects are termed
"spillover" because conduct in one market "spills over" into a second
market. 65
Congress first immunized certain types of export conduct from
antitrust laws under the Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act.66 In
United States v. Minnesota Mining & Manfacturing Co. ,67 the court
balanced the dangers of spillover against the intended benefits of a
Webb-Pomerene export exemption:
Now it may very well be that every successful export company does
inevitably affect adversely the foreign commerce of those not in the
joint enterprise and does bring the members of the enterprise so
closely together as to affect adversely the members' competition in
domestic commerce. Thus every export company may be a re-
straint. But if there are only these inevitable consequences an ex-
port association is not an unlawful restraint. The [Act] is an expres-
sion of Congressional will that such a restraint shall be permitted.
And the courts are required to give as ungrudging support to the
policy of the [Act] as to the policy of the Sherman Act. Statutory
eclecticism is not a proper judicial function. 68
Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 400 (1921); United States v.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947, 963 (D. Mass. 1950); Ryan, The
Export Trading Company Act of 1982: Antitrust Panacea, Placebo, or Pitfall?, 28
Antitrust Bull. 501, 508 (1983).
63. 1 J. Atwood & K. Brewster, supra note 62, at 288; see United States v.
Anthracite Export Ass'n, 1970 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,348 (M.D. Pa. 1970); United
States v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n, 86 F. Supp. 59, 68, 77-80 (S.D.N.Y.
1949); Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1523, 1555
(1982); Fox, Antitrust and Export Trade in Practising Law Inst., The Export Trading
Company Act, 57, 73 (1983) (Course Handbook No. 405) [hereinafter cited as Fox I];
Fox, Updating the Antitrust Guide for International Operations-A Greener Light
for Export and Investment Abroad, 15 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 709, 727 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Fox II]. For example, conduct would fall within the reach of
United States antitrust law "if a domestic export cartel were so strong as to have a
spillover effect on commerce within this country-by creating a world-wide shortage
or artificially inflated world-wide price that had the effect of raising domestic
prices." House Report, supra note 9, at 13.
64. Bruce & Peirce, supra note 9, at 991-92. Major fluctuations in world market
conditions may also have an effect on United States markets. Id. at 992.
65. See Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Guide for Interna-
tional Operations 20 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Antitrust Guide]; Zarin, supra note
9, at 322-23.
66. See Webb-Pomerene Act, ch. 50, § 5, 40 Stat. 517 (1918) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1982)).
67. 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950).
68. Id. at 965. The legislative history indicates that Congress recognized that the
activities of Webb associations might spill over into the domestic market. See H. R.
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In accord with the court's analysis, the Justice Department has recog-
nized that a joint venture produces potential benefits of significant
economies of scale in foreign markets that may outweigh a possible
collusive spillover effect in the domestic market.69
Rep. No. 50, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1917). By enacting the Webb-Pomerene Act,
however, Congress intended to effectuate a policy that was in the national interest
and to stimulate exports even though some danger to domestic competition might
exist. 55 Cong. Rec. 2,786 (1917). The Webb-Pomerene Act permits United States
exporters to join together to engage in export trade activity that is exempt from the
Sherman Act if the exporters comply with its provisions. 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1982).
Section 2 of the Webb-Pomerene Act, id. § 62, provides that nothing in the Sherman
Act shall be construed as declaring illegal an association entered into "for the sole
purpose of engaging in export trade and actually engaged solely in such export
trade," or acts done or agreements made in the course of such export trade. Id.
There are two provisions in the Webb-Pomerene Act that limit the export exemp-
tion. First, the Webb-Pomerene association's activities may not be in restraint of
trade within the United States or in restraint of the export trade of any domestic
competitor of the association. Id. Second, the association may not enter into any
agreement that "artificially or intentionally enhances or depresses prices within the
United States of commodities of the class exported by such association, or which
substantially lessens competition within the United States or otherwise restrains trade
therein." Id. The National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Proce-
dures concluded that the Webb-Pomerene Act "creates opportunities for significant
anticompetitive spillover effects in domestic commerce." National Commission for
the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedure, Report to the President and the
Attorney General 302 (1979). Case law on Webb-Pomerene associations indicates
that the risk of a domestic spillover effect is real. In fact, the activities of Webb-
Pomerene association members are considered violations of the Sherman Act, unpro-
tected by the Act's immunity provisions, when the courts discover such a spillover
effect. See, e.g., United States v. Anthracite Export Ass'n, 1970 Trade Cas. (CCH)
73,348, at 89,402 (M.D. Pa. 1970) (Webb-Pomerene association enjoined from
jointly controlling the prices or allocating the amounts of anthracite coal to be
supplied to the army); United States v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n, 86 F. Supp.
59, 70-71, 79-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (using an export association to stabilize domestic
prices by systematically exporting surplus domestic production violated § 2 of the
Sherman Act).
For a general discussion of the Webb-Pomerene Act, see W. Fugate, Foreign
Commerce and the Antitrust Laws § 7 (3d ed. 1982); Allison, Antitrust and Foreign
Trade: Exemption for Export Associations, 11 Hous. L. Rev. 24 (1974); Chapman,
Exports & Antitrust: Must Competition Stop at the Water's Edge?, 6 Vand. J.
Transnat'l L. 399 (1973); McDermid, The Antitrust Commission and the Webb-
Pomerene Act: A Critical Assessment, 37 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 105 (1980); Note,
The Webb-Pomerene Act: A Reexamination of Export Cartels in World Trade, 19
Va. J. Int'l L. 151 (1978).
69. See Antitrust Guide, supra note 65, at 19-20. In dictum, Judge Wyzanski in
Minnesota Mining, posited that "[tihe intimate association of the principal American
producers in day-to-day manufacturing operations, their exchange of patent licenses
and industrial know-how, and their common experience in marketing and fixing
prices may inevitably reduce their zeal for competition inter sese in the American
market." 92 F. Supp. at 963. While the Antitrust Guide states that participants in a
joint venture involving actual or potential competitors should use special care "to
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Although the Minnesota Mining standard is reflected in the title III
Guidelines, 70 the Commerce and Justice Departments remain con-
cerned about cooperation among parties that directly restrains domes-
tic competition. 71 The Guidelines evidence this concern by focusing
specifically on one type of collusive behavior: the exchange of impor-
tant domestic business information among domestic competitors.72 An
export company is often in a position to be a conduit for the exchange
of business information among competing firms.73 For example, in
order to set prices on goods for export, one company must collect
relevant cost information, output potential and market demand from
insure that the parties stick strictly to the joint venture's legitimate business," Anti-
trust Guide, supra note 65, at 20, the Justice Department seems not to have accepted
Judge Wyzanski's dictum. Instead, it recognizes that while "[a]ny joint venture
among competitors involves some antitrust risk," id., this risk may be limited by
using "special care in policing [its] operations." Id.
70. Certificate Guidelines, supra note 9, at 15,939.
71. See Certificate Guidelines, supra note 9, at 15,939 ("The agencies will care-
fully evaluate the likelihood that proposed export conduct will facilitate collusion in
the domestic market, or otherwise have a substantial anticompetitive impact, before
a certificate is issued."). Commentators have described the concern that a joint
venture provides a forum that can be misused to develop agreements that restrain
domestic trade as "the potential forum argument." 2 J. Atwood & K. Brewster, supra
note 62, § 12.36, at 110.
72. See Certificate Guidelines, supra note 9, at 15,939. "[I]f the exchange of
price, output, or other sensitive information in the course of export trade will result
in a substantial lessening of competition in the domestic market, that method of
operation will not be certified.").
73. See Conrath, supra note 53, at 8-9. Many business firms that have applied for
title III certificates plan to engage in export facilitation. See, e.g., Export Trade
Certificate of Review for VEXTRAC, Ltd., Applic. No. 83-00036, at 2 (Mar. 6,
1984); Export Trade Certificate of Review for United Export Trading Ass'n (UETA),
Applie. No. 83-00023, at 2-3 (Feb. 21, 1984); Export Trade Certificate of Review for
Texas First Intercontinental Trading Co., Applic. No. 83-00019, at 4 (Dec. 7, 1983);
Export Trade Certificate of Review for Universal Trading Group Ltd. (UTG),
Applic. No. 83-00005, at 2-3 (Nov. 28, 1983). Rather than manufacture their own
products and export them, these firms will aid other firms to export products either
by acting as sales representatives in an export market or by buying the product
themselves and selling it in the export market. See, e.g., Export Trade Certificate of
Review for Int'l Trailer Sales, Inc. (ITS), Applic. No. 83-00009, at 2 (Nov. 15, 1983);
Export Trade Certificate of Review for DMT World Trade, Inc., Applic. No. 83-
00016, at 2 (Nov. 4, 1983); Export Trade Certificate of Review for Int'l Dev. Inst.
(IDI), Applic. No. 83-00001, at 2-3 (Nov. 4, 1983); Export Trade Certificate of
Review for Int'l Mktg. & Procurement Servs., Inc. (IMPS), Applic. No. 83-00002, at
2-3 (Oct. 25, 1983). If a company acts as the export sales representative for all firms
in a highly concentrated industry, it could "become a conduit for domestic price,
capacity, or output information among all the competing firms it represents." R.
Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective 145 (1976); see Conrath, supra note
53, at 9.
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participating exporters.7 4 The Guidelines provide that if the exchange
of price, output or other sensitive information will result in a substan-
tial lessening of competition in the domestic market, the conduct will
not be certified. 75
Similarly, non-certified exporters must be concerned with the spill-
over problem when sensitive domestic information is exchanged. 7
The Justice Department will evaluate the nature of the arrangement,
the participants in the arrangement and the similarities of pricing
structure in the domestic and foreign markets to ascertain whether
substantial danger of an improper exchange of domestic information
exists. 77 This concern is evidenced by the great emphasis that has been
placed on the spillover problem in title III certificates. 78
From an economic standpoint, information exchanges should not
be prohibited categorically because such exchanges may provide sig-
nificant benefits. 79 Generally, if sellers possess substantial information
74. See Export Trade Certificate of Review for VEXTRAC, Ltd., Applic. No.
83-00036, at 2 (Mar. 6, 1984); Export Trade Certificate of Review for United Export
Trading Ass'n (UETA), Applic. No. 83-00023, at 3-4 (Feb. 21, 1984); Export Trade
Certificate of Review for U.S. Farm-Raised Fish Trading Co., Inc. (Catfish), Applic.
No. 83-00004, at 1-2 (Oct. 25, 1983).
75. Certificate Guidelines, supra note 9, at 15,939.
76. See United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969);
Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 567, 584-86 (1925);
American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 387-90, 400 (1921).
For a discussion of the trade association cases see Stocking, The Rule of Reason,
Workable Competition, and the Legality of Trade Associations Activities, 21 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 527 (1954); Note, Antitrust Liability for an Exchange of Price Information-
What Happened to Container Corporation?, 63 Va. L. Rev. 639 (1977).
77. See Conrath, supra note 53, at 8. The most serious anticompetitive risk that a
joint venture poses is collusion because a joint venture can provide "a singularly
effective vehicle for cartelization." Brodley, supra note 63, at 1530. Joint ventures
may promote collusion by enabling each participant to monitor the other's behavior.
Id. at 1531. Additionally, joint ventures may "facilitate collusion by giving partici-
pating firms symmetrical goals and strategies." Id.
78. Conrath, supra note 53, at 7-8 ( "[T]he possibility of exchange of price or
related information among domestic competitors . . . has been one of the most
important antitrust issues-if not the most important antitrust issue-presented in
the early [certificate] applications.").
79. R. Posner, supra note 73, at 136; see Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United
States, 268 U.S. 563, 584 (1925) ("members of trade associations [do not] become...
conspirators merely because they gather and disseminate information ... bearing on
the business in which they are engaged and make use of it in the management and
control of their individual businesses."); Fox I, supra note 63, at 74 ("If ... collabo-
ration... is intended to gain marketing efficiencies abroad that the firms cannot
otherwise achieve... [it] might be acceptable under the U.S. antitrust law."). But
see United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 335, 338 (1969) (ex-
change of business information unlawful if it has anticompetitive effect even if
purpose of exchange is to protect legal rights from fraud).
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about their competitors' output and prices, they may be better able to
gauge market demand and allocate resources, thereby enabling them
to operate more efficiently. s0 This information, however, also may be
used in an anti-competitive manner to fix prices. 8'
An inquiry into information exchanges, therefore, should focus on
whether the market in which such an information exchange occurs has
certain characteristics that foster collusion. For example, as the mar-
ket becomes more concentrated the likelihood that an exchange of
information will foster collusion, rather than assist in equalizing sup-
80. R. Posner, supra note 73, at 136; see United States v. United States Gypsum
Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978) ("The exchange of price data and other informa-
tion among competitors does not invariably have anticompetitive effects; indeed such
practices can in certain circumstances increase economic efficiency and render mar-
kets more, rather than less, competitive."); Margulies, supra note 33, at 23 ("Certifi-
cation may be appropriate where such exchange of information are necessary to
conduct the joint export activity effectively.").
81. See R. Posner, supra note 73, at 136 ("Information is thus a two-edged sword:
it is necessary if the competitive process is to work properly, but it can also facilitate
collusion."); Brodley, supra note 63, at 1523 ("A single economic arrangement or
transaction may either cripple competition or vitally promote economic efficiency
and innovation."). Two early domestic trade association cases differentiate legal
exchanges of information among competitors from illegal collusive agreements. See
Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n. v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 567 (1925); American
Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 400, 410-11 (1921).
In American Column, a trade association composed of 365 hardwood manufactur-
ers, accounting for one-third of the total hardwood production in the United States,
had an open-competition plan that provided a central clearing-house for information
on prices, trade statistics, and practices. 257 U.S. at 391, 393, 398-99. Each member
submitted a great deal of very detailed information which was then distributed in
detailed reports to association members. Id. at 394-95. The members also met to
discuss competitve problems in the industry. Id. at 396-97. Because the purpose and
effect of such conduct was to restrain competition, the Court found a violation of § 1
of the Sherman Act. Id. at 412.
In Maple Flooring, the 22 member trade association possessed an aggregate market
share of 70 %. 268 U.S. at 565-66. The association collected and distributed informa-
tion similar to that in American Column. See id. at 566-67. The Court held that the
fact that an association provided a potential forum for an illegal restraint of competi-
tion was not sufficient to establish a violation of § I of the Sherman Act absent proof
of an agreement or action to restrain trade. Id. at 585-86.
Posner provides an insightful critique of the Supreme Court's reasoning in these
early trade association cases. See R. Posner, supra note 73, at 141. He agrees with
Justice Brandeis' dissent in American Column, 257 U.S. at 413, that "the low level of
concentration in the industry" and the fact that the mills were widely scattered made
"the inference of collusion implausible" and the establishment of "some system of
centralized information" exchange necessary. R. Posner, supra note 73, at 141. By
contrast, Posner states that "[A]n inference of collusion fairly leaps out of the facts" of
Maple Flooring in part because the compilation of average cost is a useless statistic
except for establishing a basis for a collusive price. Id. at 142-43.
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ply and demand, increases. 82 In addition, if an inelastic demand exists
at the competitive price, price collusion is more profitable.8 3 More-
over, if the product is fungible, the cost of collusion is lowered. 84
When competitors share information that will facilitate collusion
rather than improve competition, the information exchange should be
illegal.8 5 Exporters operating without a title III certificate should limit
the flow of information when market conditions exist that indicate a
serious threat of collusion because such collusion meets the jurisdic-
tional threshold of title IV and, if proven, is a violation of the Sher-
man Act."8
The efforts of the Commerce and Justice Departments to ensure
that the threat of spillover is limited are evident in a standard provi-
sion of the certificates issued. This provision prohibits any direct or
indirect disclosure of business information to a competitive firm.8 7
82. Id. at 145. A threat of output restriction exists when a joint venture encom-
passes so many firms in a concentrated market that "the opportunity to get together
and discuss the joint venture role is likely to facilitate collusion in the markets from
which they came." Applebaum, Barnett, Holmes & Pollock, Panel Discussion, Inter-
view with William F. Baxter, Ass't Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., 50 Antitrust L. J. 151,
161 (1981) (statement of William F. Baxter) [hereinafter cited as Panel Discussion].
83. Demand is inelastic when no adequate substitutes exist and demand is not
significantly affected by a "not insignificant" rise in price. Fox II, supra note 63, at
715 n.20. Elastic demand indicates that buyers will shift their demand for goods even
with a small rise in price. Id. at 716. If demand is elastic, therefore, profitable price
collusion cannot be maintained. Id.
84. R. Posner, supra note 73, at 145. A symptom of collusive pricing is "a
combination of excess capacity with frequent new entry" into the market. Id.; see
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Merger Guidelines 29 (1982) (specifying market conditions that
make collusion feasible and profitable).
85. See United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969).
86. The specific types of limitations on information exchanges that exporters
should include in their contractual agreements with their export competitors and that
may prevent antitrust violations are delineated in the certificates issued under title
III. See, e.g., Export Trade Certificate of Review for United Export Trading Ass'n
(UETA), Applic. No. 83-00023, at 3-4 (Feb. 21, 1984) (information restricted to
competitive conditions and other facts pertaining to export market only); Export
Trade Certificate of Review for Trade Dev. Corp. of Chicago (TDCC), Applic. No.
83-00012, at 3 (Nov. 23, 1983) (information restricted to export market); Export
Trade Certificate of Review for Intex Int'l Trading Co., Inc., Applic. No. 83-00008,
at 2 (Oct. 25, 1983) (information exchanged in form of draft or completed proposal);
Export Trade Certificate of Review for VEXTRAC, Ltd., Applic. No. 83-00036, at
2-3 (Mar. 6, 1983) (distribution of information separately to prospective partici-
pants).
87. The standard language in the provisions generally specifies that business
information means costs, including costs of goods sold, general sales, and administra-
tive expenses, production, capacity, inventories, domestic prices, domestic sales,
domestic orders, terms of domestic marketing or sale, United States business plans,
strategies, or methods, or any other business information that is not materially
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The contractual agreements between competitors, however, do not
have to be this restrictive. One possible reason for this broad prohibi-
tion in some certificates is that the proposed conduct in those certifi-
cates is described in very general terms.88 In addition, many of the
certificate holders are export facilitation firms that have applied to
represent "virtually any firm." 89 This open-ended conduct with its
resulting indefiniteness not only presents a substantial spillover threat,
but also makes it more difficult to gauge the extent of that threat in a
particular case. Because an exchange of information may promote,
rather than inhibit competition, a flat prohibition against any ex-
change of information is not always the preferred method for dealing
with the spillover problem 0 If the export conduct is described ade-
quately and other factors exist that minimize the threat of collusion, a
more individualized approach can be taken. 91
related to the certified conduct, unless such information has already been made
generally available to the trade or public. See Export Trade Certificate of Review for
Int'l Mktg. & Procurement Servs., Inc., (IMPS), Applic. No. 83-00002, at 4 (Oct. 25,
1983), which was the first certificate to include the standard provision information.
88. Conrath, supra note 53, at 8.
89. Id.; see, e.g., Export Trade Certificate of Review for Trade Dev. Corp. of
Chicago (TDCC), Applic. No. 83-00012, at 1 (Nov. 23, 1983) (TDCC will supply
consulting services to facilitate the export of products for suppliers entering or operat-
ing in the export markets.); Export Trade Certificate of Review for Int'l Trailer
Sales, Inc. (ITS), Applic. No. 83-00009, at 1 (Nov. 15, 1983) (ITS will provide such
export trade services as consulting and market and product research and design in all
parts of the world.); Export Trade Certificate of Review for Int'l Mktg. & Procure-
ment Servs., Inc. (IMPS), Applic. No. 83-00002, at 1 (Oct. 25, 1983) (IMPS will
provide such export trade services as consulting, international market research,
product research and design in the Middle East, Europe, the Far East, and Austra-
lia.).
90. Margulies, supra note 33, at 22-23; see United States v. United States Gyp-
sum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978). Because of the standard prohibition,
however, an information exchange often would be outside the scope of protected
conduct. Margulies, supra note 33, at 23.
91. Margulies, supra note 33, at 23. An exchange of inventory and other informa-
tion necessary to conduct joint export activity effectively should be certifiable, as long
as the exporter identifies the specific products and domestic competitors involved,
thus enabling the Commerce and Justice Departments to determine market concen-
tration, market entry conditions, and short-run supply and demand substitutability.
Id. at 23.
The government's analysis of the spillover threat should be a two-step process: (1)
whether the proposed conduct has a domestic spillover effect that violates the ETCA
standards, and (2) if so, what are the terms and conditions that can be imposed upon
the operations of the trading entity that will minimize or eliminate the spillover
effect. Zarin, supra note 9, at 323. When the exchange of information can be
described with enough specificity that the Commerce and Justice Departments can
determine that it is not anticompetitive in domestic markets, it can be certified.
Conrath, supra note 53, at 10.
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The certificate issued to Intex International Trading Company,
Inc. (Intex),912 presents one example in which the nature and context of
the information exchange was defined with sufficient specificity to
justify such an exchange. Intex will provide consulting engineering
services in all parts of the world except the United States.9 3 One
service Intex will perform is to solicit and identify overseas projects in
which some or all of its clients will join together in preparing a bid or
offering their services for the project.9 4 In order to accomplish its
export conduct, Intex must have access to certain information from
the various engineering firms. As a result, Intex applied for, and was
granted, a certificate to immunize this exchange of information from
antitrust liability.
The certificate describes in very specific terms how the information
exchange may work. It states:
Intex may receive from each client interested in participating in a
project all information relevant to the preparation of a bid or other
offer of the client's services. . . . For any specific project, Intex may
circulate the data supplied by each client for that project to all the
participating clients in the form of a draft and/or completed pro-
posal.9 5
Three factors are significant in this information exchange. First, the
exchange of information is for only one project. Spillover problems
"are less likely in a one-shot joint venture than in an ongoing arrange-
ment."9' 6 Second, the data circulated to the clients are summarized. If
information is in a less detailed form, it may be more difficult to use in
a collusive manner.9 7 Finally, Intex structured this venture to provide
92. Export Trade Certificate of Review for Intex Int'l Trading Co., Inc., Applic.
No. 83-00008 (Oct. 25, 1983).
93. Id. at 2. Almost all of the certificates specify a worldwide export market
(excluding only the United States and the United States territories). See, e.g., Export
Trade Certificate of Review for Texas First Intercontinental Trading Co., Applic.
No. 83-00019, at 3 (Dec. 7, 1983); Export Trade Certificate of Review for DMT
World Trade, Inc., Applic. No. 83-00016, at 1 (Nov. 4, 1983).
94. See Export Trade Certificate of Review for Intex Int'l Trading Co., Inc.,
Applic. No. 83-00008, at 2 (Oct. 25, 1983). The Intex arrangement is analogous to
that of a general contractor organizing subcontractors for bidding purposes. The
Antitrust Guide suggests that such an arrangement should not violate the antitrust
laws. See Antitrust Guide, supra note 65, at 19-21.
95. Export Trade Certificate of Review for Intex Int'l Trading Co., Inc., Applic.
No. 83-00008, at 2 (Oct. 25, 1983).
96. Antitrust Guide, supra note 65, at 20 n.36.
97. See Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 584-86 (1925).
The Court in Maple Flooring held that the Maple Flooring Manufacturers Associa-
tion, "which openly and fairly gather[ed] and disseminate[d] information as to the
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that only noncompetitive firms would be involved in any one proj-
ect. 9 The potential for collusion, therefore, is minimized substantially
because the information exchange is not between actual competitors. 99
Despite the existence of these safeguards in the certificate, the
Commerce Department further ensured against spillover by specifi-
cally limiting, on the basis of market share, the firms that could take
part in this venture. Because the threat of collusion increases as the
market becomes more concentrated, the Intex certificate sets limits on
market share and market strength. 100 Specific conditions also have
been included to minimize any increase of market domination. The
certificate provides that Intex may enter into relationships with up to
fifteen United States consulting engineering firms (the clients) and
that these firms will be substantially not in competition with each
other. 101 No engineering firm may have gross billings exceeding $100
million.102 When non-client consulting engineering firms are included
for a specific bid proposal, the same stipulations provide that total
annual billings must not exceed $100 million and that the firms partici-
pating in that project must be substantially not in competition. 10 3
Furthermore, in addition to the very limited information exchanges
cost of their product, the volume of production, the actual price which the product
has brought in past transactions, stocks of merchandise on hand, approximate cost of
transportation from the principal point of shipment to the points of consumption...
[did] not thereby engage in unlawful restraint of commerce." 268 U.S. at 586. In
American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921), the Court
had held that a plan by hardwood companies to exchange detailed information
through the American Hardwood Manufacturers Association violated § 1 of the
Sherman Act. Id. at 412. The Maple Flooring Court distinguished American Column
by stating that "the character of the information which had been gathered [in
American Column] and the use which was made of it led irresistibly to the conclusion
that [it] had resulted, or would necessarily result, in a concerted effort of the
defendants to curtail production or raise prices of commodities shipped in interstate
commerce." 268 U.S. at 584-85.
98. See Export Trade Certificate of Review for Intex Int'l Trading Co., Inc.,
Applic. No. 83-00008, at 2 (Oct. 25, 1983). This condition was suggested by Intex,
not by the Commerce Department. See Scouton, Six Firms Certified Under the
Export Trading Company Act, Bus. Am., Nov. 28, 1983, at 24.
99. The courts and the Justice Department have been concerned with informa-
tion exchanges between actual competitors. See, e.g., United States v. Container
Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 336 (1969); Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States,
268 U.S. 563, 582 (1925); American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257
U.S. 377, 387 (1921).
100. See Export Trade Certificate of Review for Intex Int'l Trading Co., Inc.,
Applic. No. 83-00008, at 2 (Oct. 25, 1983).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See id. at 3.
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described above, Intex is subject to the standard prohibition against
disclosure of information. 0 4
Using the Intex certificate as a guide, companies engaging in simi-
lar, but uncertified, conduct must be concerned whether they are
dealing with actual or potential competitors, the market share of each
of the firms involved and whether the export activity is ongoing in
nature or is limited to discrete projects. The spillover problem varies
greatly depending on the export arrangement, the export conduct and
the objectives of the export venture. Because the spillover threat is
fact-specific,105 if an exporter operating without a title III certificate is
involved in export conduct that is identical or nearly identical to the
certified conduct, following the specific provisions in the certificate
should enable the exporter to avoid spillover problems. Any exchange
of information that is prohibited in a certificate would violate the
antitrust laws and would be prohibited under title IV, thereby bring-
ing the exporter within the jurisdictional scope of the Sherman Act.
The Justice Department, however, may tolerate more spillover in the
activities under title III because those activities are monitored closely
under the certification procedure. 106
The certificate application of VEXTRAC, Ltd.10 7 presents another
problem. VEXTRAC is a not-for-profit corporation controlled by the
Virginia Port Authority. 08 To encourage the use of Virginia ports,
VEXTRAC arranged an export joint venture that requires exporters to
use Virginia ports. In exchange, VEXTRAC will provide export-facili-
tation services including financing activities, legal assistance and mar-
ket analysis. 109 VEXTRAC applied for a certificate that would permit
the collection of information necessary to study the feasibility of ex-
port joint ventures. The certificate that was issued allows VEXTRAC
to collect from prospective participants commercial, financial and
104. Id. ("Intex will not intentionally disclose, directly or indirectly, to a client or
to a non-client firm . . . any business information obtained from a client or from a
non-client firm.").
105. E.g., Export Trade Certificate of Review for VEXTRAC, Ltd., Applic. No.
83-00036 (Mar. 6, 1984) (certificate structured to deal with fact-specific spillover
problem); Export Trade Certificate of Review for Intex Int'l Trading Co., Inc.,
Applic. No. 83-00008 (Oct. 25, 1983) (same).
106. An additional safeguard against spillover is that certificate holders must
submit annual reports to the Commerce Department. See 15 U.S.C. § 4018 (1982).
The certificate issued to Intex exemplifies the goals of the certification process in that
it allows for small engineering firms to join together to bid on large overseas projects
through facilitating mechanisms provided by the Intex corporation. See Export
Trade Certificate of Review for Intex Int'l Trading Co., Inc., Applic. No. 83-00008,
at 2-3 (Oct. 25, 1983). These firms probably would otherwise be unable to join
together, especially in terms of information sharing.
107. Export Trade Certificate of Review for VEXTRAC, Ltd., Applic. No. 83-
00036 (Mar. 6, 1984).




industrial information on the condition that VEXTRAC limit access to
this information and provide only average figures from the informa-
tion it receives. 110
The conditions under which VEXTRAC may disseminate informa-
tion provide several safeguards against spillover. VEXTRAC cannot
disclose the number or identities of companies solicited and must
distribute separately to each prospective participant the results of its
feasibility study."' The study must contain information limited solely
to the export markets. 112 VEXTRAC may not separately distribute
specific information concerning domestic prices, costs of production,
production capacity, production volume, domestic sales volume or
inventories. " 3 All such information must be conveyed solely as aver-
ages. 114
The safeguards against spillover found in the VEXTRAC certificate
demonstrate a concern for the exchange of information that is parallel
to that of the dissemination of information cases in the domestic
context in which the standards are very stringent. 1 5 Because many
export arrangements involve an intermediary such as VEXTRAC, the
limitations outlined in the certificate should be followed closely to
avoid possible antitrust liability created by an anti-competitive effect
on domestic prices."16
110. Id. at 3.
111. Id. at 2-3.
112. Id. Such information includes selling strategies, prices in the foreign market,
projected demand, customary terms of sale and information on expenses specific to
the actual exporting to the markets. Id.
113. Id. at 3.
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969);
Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 579-84 (1925); American
Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 400 (1921).
116. Another certificate that authorizes a limited amount of information exchange
was issued to Barlar International, Inc., which deals mainly in military products and
related services. See Export Trade Certificate of Review for Barlar Int'l, Inc., Applic.
No. 83-00020, at 1-2 (Dec. 9, 1983). Barlar functions as an export services intermedi-
ary between buyers and sellers. See id. at 2. Barlar may obtain lists of potential
buyers and furnish its products list to such buyers. Id. When a buyer requests the
price of a particular product, Barlar may ask one or more United States suppliers
individually to supply a price quotation for that product. Id. Barlar may transmit the
price quotation to the buyer after adding its mark-up to the United States supplier's
price. Id. Because there is no way that Barlar can act as a facilitating conduit for
information exchanges among competitors, no condition prohibiting exchanges of
information was necessary in this certificate. Similarly, if only two companies are
involved in an enterprise, and one is a manufacturer and the other an export
facilitator, the spillover threat is minimal. See Export Trade Certificate of Review
for U.S. Export & Trading Co. (USEX), Applic. No. 83-00024, at 2 (Dec. 23, 1983)
(USEX may enter into agreements with Brownline Pipe Company, Inc.).
Another company that will act as an export intermediary dealing in a varied
product line is the Trade Development Corporation of Chicago (TDCC). See Export
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A noncertified exporter should be careful in structuring its export
arrangement to avoid possible antitrust liability from the inference
that sensitive domestic information is being exchanged among domes-
tic competitors. The information exchange should be limited solely to
information concerning export markets, and when feasible, exchanges
of sensitive information should be limited to non-competitors in the
domestic market. For example, this can be done by using an interme-
diary between buyers and sellers. 117 When such limitations are not
practical, an exchange of information should be made in the form of
averages or in other summary form."" Although a title III certificate
is necessary to ensure certainty, an exporter that includes these limita-
tions in its agreements can be reasonably confident that its activities
will not be challenged on the basis of an unlawful exchange of infor-
mation.
III. THE FORECLosuRE EFFEcT: AN UNREASONABLE RESTRAINT ON
EXPORT CoMPErITORS
Foreclosure is the term used to describe the effect of conduct that
reduces or eliminates the opportunities of export competitors.' 19 Fore-
Trade Certificate of Review for Trade Dev. Corp. of Chicago (TDCC), Applic. No.
83-00012, at 1-2 (Nov. 23, 1983). TDCC will provide consulting services to facilitate
the export of any product for suppliers (United States manufacturer or supplier, its
parent or subsidiary) that are operating in, or entering the Asian export market. See
id. at 1. TDCC is allowed to advise the suppliers of products and services of relevant
facts concerning the Asian export markets in order to assist them in planning sales
strategies. Id. at 3. TDCC, however, is still subject to the standard provision prohib-
iting information exchanges. Id. Additionally, TDCC may disclose information re-
sulting from its consulting services in the Asian market to suppliers of any product,
again subject to the standard information exchange prohibition. Id.
117. See, e.g., Export Trade Certificate of Review for VEXTRAC, Ltd., Applic.
No. 83-00036, at 2 (Mar. 6, 1984) (VEXTRAC may solicit information from compan-
ies and will distribute the information separately to each prospective participant.);
Export Trade Certificate of Review for United Export Trading Ass'n (UETA), Ap-
plic. No. 83-00023, at 3 (Feb. 21, 1984) (UETA may collect information from, and
discuss and communicate information with, two or more members regarding com-
petitive conditions or other facts relevant to the scale of products in the export
market.).
118. See Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 584-86 (1925);
Export Trade Certificate of Review for VEXTRAC, Ltd., Applic. No. 83-00036, at
2-3 (Mar. 6, 1984). Another method by which the exchange of information can be
accomplished with little risk of collusion is delineated in the Export Trade Certificate
of Review for U.S. Farm-Raised Fish Trading Co., Inc. (Catfish), Applic. No. 83-
00004 at 1-2 (Oct. 25, 1983) (the company will set purchase prices and allocate
export orders among its member processors through a sealed bid procedure or a
rotating bid system in which the periodic purchases will be awarded to one or more
of the member processors in turn or some combination of these two procedures).
119. 1 J. Atwood & K. Brewster, supra note 62, §§ 9.23-9.28 at 300; see Antitrust




closure is significant because of the antitrust concern with maintain-
ing free competitive access to markets for rival sellers.1 20 Although
foreclosure is a concern under title 111,121 the ETCA contemplates,
and the Guidelines specifically authorize, exclusive arrangements that
foreclose trade opportunities in foreign markets of competing United
States exporters. 122 Arrangements of this type are deemed necessary to
achieve the goals of the ETCA.123 The same goals exist under title
IV.124 Because export activity under title IV lacks the statutory safe-
guards present in title III certification, however, a greater danger of
antitrust violation exists under title IV. If foreclosure of export oppor-
tunities of United States competitors constitutes a direct, substantial
and reasonably foreseeable restraint, the Sherman Act is violated. 125
In determining the seriousness of the foreclosure threat, therefore,
certain factors must be analyzed. One commentator has suggested
that such an analysis should center on the likelihood of predatory
conduct 126 or on the effect the conduct will have on a competitor's
supply of products or access to foreign markets. 2
7
If export activity operates to restrain the exports of non-participat-
ing firms, a foreclosure problem may exist. 1 28 Whether the foreclosure
120. See United States v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n, 86 F. Supp. 59
(S.D.N.Y. 1949). In Alkali, two Webb-Pomerene export associations agreed among
themselves and with other foreign producers to allocate world markets in alkalis. id.
at 61-66. The court held that the defendants' conduct was an illegal restraint of the
export trade of domestic competitors. Id. at 67 ("For as long as one rival of an export
association sought to vend his wares in foreign territory, international agreements of
the kind here involved could do naught but restrain his trade."). In four more recent
lower court decisions, the courts focused on the foreclosure of the export opportuni-
ties of domestic competitors. See Dominicus American Bohio v. Gulf & W. Indus.,
Inc., 473 F. Supp. 680, 684-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Waldbaum v. Worldvision Enter-
prises, Inc., 1978-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,378, at 76,255, 76,257-58 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); Industria Siciliana Asfalti, Bitumi, S.p.A. v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co.,
1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,256, at 70,783 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Todhunter-Mitchell
& Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 610, 622-24 (E.D. Pa.), modified on
other grounds, 283 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
121. See 15 U.S.C. § 4013(a)(1), (3) (1982).
122. See Certificate Guidelines, supra note 9, at 15,938.
123. Because exclusivity agreements can violate both the first and third certifica-
tion standards by having an adverse affect on United States export competitors, 15
U.S.C. § 4013(a)(1), (3) (1982), such arrangements would not be authorized specifi-
cally if they were not considered an important element of successful export ventures.
124. The goal of both title III and title IV is to improve United States export
performance. See House Report, supra note 9, at 1 (title IV); Senate Report, supra
note 3, at 2 (title III).
125. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
126. Zarin, supra note 9, at 348.
127. Id.
128. A major purpose of antitrust enforcement is to protect American export and
investment opportunities against privately-imposed restrictions. Each United States-
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is substantial or significant enough to deny certification will depend
on several factors: the extent to which foreclosed competitors have
access to other markets, 129 the amount of export commerce fore-
closed,130 the duration of the foreclosure,' 3' and the business justifica-
tions that may exist for the foreclosure. 32
based firm should be allowed to compete on the merits and should not be shut out by
some restriction imposed by a competitor. Antitrust Guide, supra note 65, at 5.
129. In the international context, unless United States competitors would be fore-
closed from access to so vital an outlet that collusion would be a dangerous risk, the
Justice Department would not consider such foreclosure illegal. U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Merger Guidelines, reprinted in 1 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 4345 (Aug. 9, 1982).
130. In evaluating the extent of foreclosure, two factors must be considered: the
share of the United States industry's total foreign commerce that is preempted and
the significance of that foreign commerce to the total business of the industry. 1 J.
Atwood & K. Brewster, supra note 62, § 9.28b, at 305. The crucial factors are the
volume and relative share of the total amount of commerce foreclosed, rather than
the size of the seller and the degree of foreclosure in separate markets. Id. at 305. For
example, tying arrangements could foreclose a competitor's marketing opportunities
both in the United States and in all export markets. Because the foreclosure would be
complete, there would be no serious issue as to the relevant geographic market or the
significance of the foreclosure. Id. at 305 n.11; see Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswa-
genwerk A.G., 1975-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,307, at 66,210 (S.D. Tex. 1974) (tying
arrangement resulted in complete foreclosure of plaintiff's marketing opportunities).
Foreclosure of foreign industrial consumers by tying arrangements or requirements
contracts is probably more significant than foreclosure of distributive outlets because
it may not be possible to sell at all unless an American exporter can sell to industrial
consumers. 1 J. Atwood & K. Brewster, supra note 62, § 9.28b, at 305-06.
131. See Antitrust Guide, supra note 65, at 21.
132. The business justifications must be balanced against the extent of foreclosure
caused by the restriction. The Justice Department recently announced additional
guidelines to analyze the effect on United States competitors. Ryan, supra note 62, at
511. If all of the United States suppliers of a given product participate in the joint
venture (or if all have a standing invitation to join), no joint venture antitrust
problem should exist because no domestic competitor is being foreclosed. Id.; see
Export Trade Certificate of Review for U.S. Farm-Raised Fish Trading Company,
Inc. (Catfish), Applic. No. 83-00004 (Oct. 25, 1983) (example of transaction in
which all suppliers participate); Sylvester, Is There a New Tool in Antitrust, Nat'l
L.J., Dec. 19, 1983, at 8, col. 1 (virtually all the United States suppliers are partici-
pating in the Catfish joint venture). At the other factual extreme, if only one non-
dominant supplier participates in the joint venture along with noncompeting suppli-
ers, no antitrust problem should exist, regardless of the number of participants, as
long as each participant accounts for only a modest share of the applicable United
States and foreign markets. See Export Trade Certificate of Review for Intex Int'l
Trading Co., Inc., Applic. No. 83-00008, at 2 (Oct. 25, 1983) (engineering firms are
"substantially not in competition with each other"). It is the situation in between
these two factual extremes that causes an antitrust problem; that is, when a joint
venture of competing suppliers, comprising fewer than all competitors, possesses
market power in the relevant market and engages in predatory conduct to the
detriment of excluded competitors. Ryan, supra note 62, at 511 (quoting remarks of
William F. Baxter before the Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. (May 10, 1983)); see Panel Discus-
sion, supra note 82, at 155.
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Title III addresses the foreclosure issue in both the first and third
standards. 133 Under the first standard, conduct that has a substantial
anti-competitive effect on United States export competitors will not be
certified. 34 Under the third standard, conduct that unreasonably re-
strains the trade of United States export competitors will not be certi-
fied. 135 In determining what constitutes a substantial anti-competitive
effect and what constitutes an unreasonable trade restraint, the
Guidelines indicate that the goals of the ETCA should be consid-
ered. 136 Restraints that serve legitimate objectives under the ETCA
133. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 4013(a)(1), (3) (1982). In stating that conduct will be
certified unless it has a substantial anti-competitive impact on the domestic market or
on United States competitors, the Guidelines clarify the meaning of "substantial" by
citing United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947, 965 (D.
Mass. 1950). Certificate Guidelines, supra note 9, at 15,939 n.12. Legislative history
suggests that Congress intended to clarify that only a substantial restraint of trade
would be considered unreasonable. 127 Cong. Rec. S3631-32 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 1981)
(remarks of Sen. Danforth). The Guidelines suggest that legislative history should be
used when interpreting title III standards. See Certificate Guidelines, supra note 9,
at 15,939 n.11.
134. See 15 U.S.C. § 4013(a)(1) (1982). A balancing approach should be used to
determine the substantiality of the anti-competitive effect and the unreasonableness
of the trade restraint. The balance is not always easy to achieve because often trade
restraints are essential to achieve satisfactory penetration of a foreign market. 1 J.
Atwood & K. Brewster, supra note 62, § 9.19a, at 295. Restraints that increase the
flow of United States exports and enhance competition in the foreign markets may
decrease competition in United States export commerce. Id. A joint venture can be
defined effectively for antitrust purposes by focusing on the main factors that make
joint ventures subject to antitrust concern-"the potential efficiency gains and anti-
competitive risks of the joint enterprise." Brodley, supra note 63, at 1525. The
advancement of export commerce "should be recognized as a legitimate objective of
commercial conduct, and a restraint which serves that objective without undue
limitations on the commercial freedom of others should be accepted as reasonable." 1
J. Atwood & K. Brewster, supra note 62, § 7.33, at 220.
135. The third standard prohibits unfair methods of competition against domestic
export competitors. 15 U.S.C. § 4013(a)(3) (1982). When title III was passed, there
was initial disagreement about whether, because the standard was based on the
Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA), id. § 45(a)(1), it should be construed by
referring to judicial decisions that had interpreted the Act. See, e.g., FTC v. Sperry
& Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972); FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316
(1966); FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948); Fashion Originators' Guild v.
FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). The Guidelines specifically reject this approach, noting
that because the title III standard is narrower on its face and the policies and
purposes underlying the ETCA are different from the FTCA, any judicial decisions
interpreting § 5 of the FTCA "have only limited precedential significance." Certifi-
cate Guidelines, supra note 9, at 15,939.
136. See id. at 15,938-39. One of the goals of title III is to enable American
exporters to compete against foreign competitors. See 15 U.S.C. § 4001(b) (1982). It
is necessary to recognize that while excluding an export competitor from a market is
objectionable because it may undermine competition and offend notions of fairness,
it may be essential to the viability of a productive joint export venture. Brodley,
supra note 63, at 1533-39. Commentators and the courts differ as to when market
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should not be designated unreasonable merely because they restrain
other domestic competitors. The Guidelines state that although export
sales by a certificate holder displace sales of other United States ex-
porters, this is not sufficient to deny certification, whereas the deliber-
ate and unreasonable restriction of domestic export competitors from
their source of supply might bar certification. 137 These examples di-
rectly apply to those exporters not certified under title III.
The Justice Department has indicated that the formation of "more
or less" permanent joint ventures that have the potential to become
"bottleneck monopol[ies]' 38 is an unreasonable restraint in the inter-
national context. An analogous situation in the domestic market oc-
curs when a competitor is denied access to an indispensable or "essen-
tial facility."139 If the essential facility doctrine applies to international
transactions, then other competitors in that industry must be given
access to the market on reasonable terms. 140
exclusion and discriminatory access are justified. See, e.g., Silver v. N.Y.S.E., 373
U.S. 341 (1963) (stock exchange precluded competitors from using wire services);
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (leading news wire service
excluded competitors); Hecht v. Pro-Football Inc., 570 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(sports stadium possibly "essential facility" requiring access by competitors on equal
terms), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978); Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Prod.
Bldg., Inc., 194 F.2d 484, 488 (1st Cir.) (monopoly fruit and vegetable exchange
denied access to wholesaler), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 817 (1952). See generally R.
Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 333 (1978) (joint venture market exclusion rests on
predatory use of an economy of scale); R. Posner, supra note 73, at 211 (access-
mandatory remedies for joint ventures criticized as procedures requiring excessive
judicial regulation); Davidow, Antitrust, Foreign Policy, and International Buying
Cooperation, 84 Yale L.J. 218, 284 (1974) (access to be given as necessary to maintain
equal competitive viability).
137. See Certificate Guidelines, supra note 9, at 15,939.
138. Antitrust Guide, supra note 65, at 22.
139. Id. at 21-22. The Antitrust Guide states that a facility is essential if its
exclusion "imposes a serious handicap on other members of the industry." Id. For
example, a joint venture that ties up the only available distributing facilities in a
competitively significant market would constitute an essential facility. See id. at 47
n.80. By excluding or hindering exporters outside of the export venture from having
access to an essential requirement, the venture may injure competition. Brodley,
supra note 63, at 1532. See United States v. Learner Co., 215 F. Supp. 603, 607 (D.
Hawaii 1963) (foreclosure of Japanese export market precluded export sales by com-
peting firms). The doctrine is not applied to a short-term consortium because "[i]t is
unlikely that any particular short-term consortium is an 'essential facility'." Antitrust
Guide, supra note 65, at 22.
140. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1945). Generally,
the "essential facility" or "bottleneck monopoly" doctrine has been applied to perma-
nent joint ventures such as those controlling a dominant stock exchange, Silver v.
N.Y.S.E., 373 U.S. 341, 347-49 (1963), a dominant rnational newsgathering service,
Associated Press v. United States, 226 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1945), and a terminal railroad,
United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383, 405-06 (1912).
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Denying a competitor access to the venture may create a bottleneck
if the export arrangement is more competitive than unilateral activity
by an exporter in the export market. The Guidelines state that con-
duct will be more closely examined when few United States competi-
tors in the export market exist and when the participants in the
proposed conduct have a large market share.141 The combined market
power of the exporter and the distributor is significant in determining
whether the foreclosure is so substantial as to be unreasonable. 142
Foreclosure also may occur when an export venture monopolizes an
export market. 143 In order to determine what constitutes foreclosure,
the relevant product and geographic markets must be delineated. 144
141. Certificate Guidelines, supra note 9, at 15,939. An analysis of the market
structure in the United States for the goods and services to which the exporter's
conduct applies is necessary in order to evaluate the likely anti-competive effects in
the domestic market. Id. ("The likelihood and severity of such effects may depend on
the concentration of the relevant market(s), the ease of new entry and the market
power of the applicant and its members."). A joint venture between competitors
having market power will be closely scrutinized. Brodley, supra note 63, at 1535. In
determining market power, "the aggregate market shares of each, as well as market
shares of their parents, subsidiaries and affiliates, will be considered." Certificate
Guidelines, supra note 9, at 15,939. Ordinarily the proposed conduct will be more
closely scrutinized for possible anti-competitive impact when these markets are con-
centrated or when the participants have a large market share. Id.
142. Certificate Guidelines, supra note 9, at 15,939. Market power is defined as
"the ability of a firm (or a group of firms acting jointly), to raise price above the
competitive level without losing so many sales so rapidly that the price increase is
unprofitable. "Landes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 Harv. L. Rev.
937, 937 (1981). Another approach to evaluating the extent of foreclosure is to con-
sider other factors such as the share of the United States industry's total foreign
commerce that is preempted and the significance of that foreign commerce in the
total industry. See 1 J. Atwood & K. Brewster, supra note 62, § 9.28b, at 305. The
key factor is the volume and relative share of the total amount of commerce fore-
closed rather than size of the seller and the degree of foreclosure in separate markets.
See id.
143. Brodley, supra note 63, at 1532. If a joint export venture monopolizes an
export market or the venture has natural monopoly characteristics and refuses to deal
with export competitors, such a refusal may totally exclude the competitors from a
market. Id.
144. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961) ("[T]he
threatened foreclosure of competition must be in relation to the market affected.").
There are differing views on how to determine the relevant product and geographic
markets. See, e.g., P. Areeda, Antitrust Analysis 239-40 (3d ed. 1981) (The relevant
market includes "those suppliers-of the same or related product in the same or
related geographic area-whose existence significantly restrains defendant's power.
This process of inclusion and exclusion is spoken of as 'market definition.' "); Landes
& Posner, supra note 142, at 960 ("[T]he usual legal procedure in an antitrust case in
which market power is at issue is first to define a relevant market, then to compute
the defendant's market share, and finally to infer the presence or absence of market
power from that share.").
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The Antitrust Guide states that, in some cases, foreclosure of a single
national market may be determinative. 145 A wide range of market
options, however, must be considered. 146 Because the objective of title
III and title IV is to increase export trade, geographic markets should
be broadly defined. 147 For the purpose of foreclosure, the definition of
market should depend on the actual demand for products exported.
The market, therefore, should reflect a multi-national demand for the
product. 14 The foreclosure of a single national market may not be
determinative when alternative export opportunities "abound."'
149 If
each national market were considered a separate geographic market,
the threat of foreclosure could preclude exporters from using exclusiv-
ity arrangements. 50 Exclusivity arrangements may result in foreclo-
145. Antitrust Guide, supra note 65, at 47 n.80 ("If the exclusive arrangement
means not only that the American exporter will not appoint any other distributor in
the territory, but that the foreign distributor will not import goods for any other
Amercian manufacturer,. .. [it is] relevant whether the foreign distributor were such
an important outlet in its own country that the product exclusivity feature of the
agreement necessarily restricted in an important way the ability of other American
firms to export to that market.").
146. See, e.g., 1 J. Atwood & K. Brewster, supra note 62, § 7.23, at 209 (foreclo-
sure should be measured against aggregate foreign business opportunities); Landes &
Posner, supra note 142, at 962-63 (elasticities of demand and supply as well as market
share are relevant in assessing market power).
147. See 1 J. Atwood & K. Brewster, supra note 62, § 7.23, at 209.
148. In considering American foreign trade, foreclosure should be measured by
taking into consideration all of the markets available to American firms, not simply a
national market. See Address of William F. Baxter, Ass't Atty. Gen. Antitrust Div.,
before the Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. (May 10, 1983), reprinted in 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
50,447, at 56,051 (May 23, 1983) ("The intensity of competition at the interna-
tional level in many areas has increased to the point where the relevant market, as
that term is used in antitrust ... is a worldwide market."). This is evidenced by the
fact that most certificates include an export market that is worldwide, excluding only
the United States and United States territories. See, e.g., Export Trade Certificate of
Review for Texas First Intercontinental Trading Co., Applic. No. 83-00019, at 3
(Dec. 7, 1983); Export Trade Certificate of Review for Int'l Trailer Sales, Inc. (ITS),
Applic. No. 83-00009, at 1 (Nov. 15, 1983); Export Trade Certificate of Review for
DMT World Trade, Inc., Applic. No. 83-00016, at 1 (Nov. 4, 1983).
149. 1 J. Atwood & K. Brewster, supra note 62, § 9.28b, at 305. Courts, however,
have held that the foreclosure of a single national market is sufficient for an antitrust
violation. See, e.g., Pacific Coast Agricultural Export Ass'n v. Sunkist Growers, Inc.,
526 F.2d 1196, 1203-04 (9th Cir. 1975) (Sunkist found guilty of conspiring to restrain
and monopolize the export of Arizona and California oranges to Hong Kong), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976); United States v. Learner Co., 215 F. Supp. 603, 606 (D.
Hawaii 1963) (exports to Japan adopted as market when foreclosure of the market
precluded export sales by competing firms).
150. 1 J. Atwood & K. Brewster, supra note 62, § 7.24, at 211. The Antitrust
Guide states that it is relevant whether a foreign distributor is such an important
outlet in its own country that the exclusivity arrangement necessarily restricts the
ability of other American firms to export to that market. Antitrust Guide, supra note
13271984]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
sure when an American exporter appoints an exclusive foreign distrib-
utor and prevents another American competitor from selling in that
territory.' 5' The Guidelines contain an underlying assumption that
exclusivity arrangements are necessary to increase exports. 152 Under
title III, therefore, in most situations, an exclusivity arrangement may
be deemed reasonable if increased exports result. 15 3
Exclusivity agreements are equally necessary to facilitate the trade
activities of exporters operating without a certificate. As in dealing
with the threat of spillover, it is beneficial for an exporter operating
without a certificate to examine the certificates that have been issued
under title III in order to anticipate forelosure problems and to deter-
mine 'what type of agreements are permitted.
The certificate issued to the U.S. Farm-Raised Fish Trading Com-
pany, Inc. (Catfish) ,1 4 permits conduct that raises traditional anti-
trust concerns.' 5 5 The certificate allows Catfish to market its fish
directly or through intermediaries on an exclusive basis. 15 The Com-
pany may enter into agreements with the member processors that
prohibit the members from exporting independently of the company,
65, at 47 n.80. Analogously, if each country were considered a separate geographic
market and American firms were precluded from exporting to that market because of
an exclusive foreign distributorship arrangement, the foreclosure of export competi-
tors would be absolute. See id.
151. See Antitrust Guide, supra note 65, at 5.
152. See Certificate Guidelines, supra note 9, at 15,939. Courts will analyze the
relevant market and the foreclosure effect of the exclusivity arrangement because the
arrangement may be beneficial and have only a minor anticompetitive effect. 1 J.
Atwood & K. Brewster, supra note 62, § 9.27, at 303.
153. The Guidelines explicitly authorize such arrangements. Certificate Guide-
lines, supra note 9, at 15,938.
154. Export Trade Certificate of Review for U.S. Farm-Raised Fish Trading Co.,
Inc. (Catfish), Applic. No. 83-00004 (Oct. 25, 1983). The Catfish certificate is
unusual in that the Catfish Farmers of America, a trade association that includes
almost all of America's catfish farmers, formed an export trading company to apply
for a title III certificate. Scouton, supra note 98, at 24. More than 400 catfish farmers
from 27 states are members. Id. at 23. The certificate issued to Catfish is "the best
example so far of what the legislation was designed to do." Sylvester, supra note 132,
at 8, col. 1 (statement of Kermit W. Almstedt, Sen. Fin. Comm. staffperson who
helped draft the ETCA).
155. Such concerns include fixing export purchase and sales prices for its members
and marketing its product through exclusive dealing arrangements. See Export Trade
Certificate of Review for U.S. Farm-Raised Fish Trading Co., Inc. (Catfish), Applic.
No. 83-00004, at 2 (Oct. 25, 1983). Because catfish farmers are domestic competitors,
and their trade association includes both breeders and processors, the antitrust laws
at one time prohibited them from participating jointly in foreign ventures. Sylvester,
supra note 132, at 8, col. 1; see id. (quoting P. Anthony Roger, Esq.) ("Without the
protections afforded by certification [the Catfish farmers] would not have made their
move overseas.").
156. Export Trade Certificate of Review for U.S. Farm-Raised Fish Trading Co.,
Inc. (Catfish), Applic. No. 83-00004, at 2 (Oct. 25, 1983).
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either directly or indirectly through other export intermediaries.1 57
In analyzing the foreclosure problem arising from these exclusive
marketing provisions, the significant factor in the Catfish arrange-
ment is that virtually all of the American catfish farmers are members
of this export company. 15 If all industry members are allowed to
participate, no foreclosure problem can exist.' 5  Frequently, fore-
closure is not a serious threat because of the nature of the industry's
product line.16 0 For example, DMT World Trade, Inc. (DMT)'I' is an
exporter of construction and mining machinery. 6 2 Under its certifi-
cate, DMT can enter into exclusive sales agreements with United
States manufacturers and suppliers, 16 3 exclusive foreign distributor-
ship agreements164 and exclusive purchasing agent agreements. 65
Similar exclusive dealing arrangements are found in the certificate
held by International Trailer Sales, Inc. (ITS),' 6 6 an exporter of com-
157. Id.
158. See Sylvester, supra note 132, at 8, col. 1.
159. Ryan, supra note 62, at 711. Another example in which no foreclosure
problems exist is the Export Trade Certificate of Review for U.S. Export Trading Co.
(USEX), Applic. No. 83-00024 (Dec. 23, 1983). The USEX arrangement involved the
cooperation of only two companies in a highly competitive product industry. See id.
at 1-2. The likelihood that the exclusive selling and distributorship agreements would
pose foreclosure problems, therefore, is more remote. See Certificate Guidelines,
supra note 9, at 15,939 (conduct more closely scrutinized when market is highly
concentrated).
160. If the product is both manufactured by many United States competitors and
has a large worldwide demand, the threat of foreclosure is minimal. See Certificate
Guidelines, supra Note 9, at 15,939; 1 J. Atwood & K. Brewster, supra note 62,
§ 928.b, at 304.
161. Export Trade Certificate of Review for DMT World Trade, Inc., Applic. No.
83-00016 (Nov. 4, 1983).
162. Id. at 1.
163. Id. at 2. In these agreements, "the manufacturer or supplier may agree not to
sell, directly or through any other intermediary, into the export markets in which the
DMT World Trade exclusively represents the manufacturer or supplier, or to any of
DMT World Trade's competitors in export trade; [additionally,] DMT World Trade
may agree not to represent any competitors of such manufacturer or supplier, unless
authorized by the manufacturer or supplier." Id.
164. Id. DMT may "[e]nter into exclusive agreements with foreign representa-
tives, (including agents, brokers, and distributors.)." Id. These agreements may
provide that DMT will "deal in the export market only through its foreign represent-
ative; and ... the foreign representative may agree not to represent [DMT's] com-
petitors in the export market," unless so authorized by DMT. Id.
165. Id. DMT may "[e]nter into exclusive agreements with an individual buyer in
the Export Markets to act as a purchasing agent with respect to a particular transac-
tion." Id.
166. Export Trade Certificate of Review for Int'l Trailer Sales, Inc. (ITS), Applic.
No. 83-00009 (Nov. 15, 1983).
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mercial trailers and other construction equipment and export trade
services. 167 The certificate allows ITS to enter into exclusive sales
contracts and foreign distributorship agreements.168  A significant
difference between the certificate issued to DMT and the one held by
ITS is that the latter has a time limitation of three years on the
exclusive agreements. 1 69 Inclusion of such a time limitation means that
the Commerce Department has to conduct little or no market analy-
sis. 170 Furthermore, such a time limitation minimizes the possibility
that "changed circumstances" will cause the export conduct to violate
the title III standards. 171
Because of the varied nature of the exporters' conduct and other
factors such as the exporters' market strength, the certificates include
standard provisions for arrangements that are both exclusive and
nonexclusive. 172 For example, a company may enter into any number
167. Id. at 1. These services include maintenance, safety, repair and other support
services for its products, and export trade services such as consulting, international
market research, product research and design exclusively for export, transportation
and freight forwarding. Id. There seems to be little difference in the general types of
product ITS and DMT sell, that is, a varied product line with a fairly open market
and many competing suppliers, producers and buyers that ordinarily would indicate
a very small possibility for foreclosure. See Certificate Guidelines, supra note 9, at
15,939.
168. Export Trade Certificate of Review for Int'l Trailer Sales, Inc. (ITS), Applic.
No. 83-00009, at 2 (Nov. 15, 1983).
169. Compare Export Trade Certificate of Review for Int'l Trailer Sales, Inc.(ITS), Applic. No. 83-00009, at 2 (Nov. 15, 1983) (3-year time limitation) with
Export Trade Certificate of'Review for DMT World Trade, Inc., Applic. No. 83-
00016 (Nov. 4, 1983) (no time limitation).
170. See Conrath, supra note 53, at 11.
171. Setting a time limitation on the immunity for certain export conduct is not
the only way in which the Commerce Department has dealt with the problem of
changed circumstances. All of the issued certificates include a condition that the
exporter comply with requests made by the Commerce and Justice Departments for
information or documents relevant to certified conduct. Although it may be posssible
to predict the concentration of a market for five or ten years, it is much more difficult
to forecast for an indefinite period of time whether the factors that foster collusion
will increase when the certificates include no time limitations. See Conrath, supra
note 53, at 11. In the Export Trade Certificate of Review for United Export Trading
Ass'n (UETA), Applic. No. 83-00023, at 6-7 (Feb. 21, 1984), the Commerce Depart-
ment required an annual report. The report must include all domestic and export
sales information. Id. If the total export sales of certified products and services
exceeds $1 million, the exporter must provide an itemization of export sales by
product/service lines and geographical areas listed in the certificate. Id. The informa-
tion in the report will enable the Commerce Department to monitor sales patterns
and market share which may indicate either foreclosure or collusion.
172. See Certificate Guidelines, supra note 9, at 15,939. The exclusive arrange-
ments in other certificates are very similar. For example, International Marketing &
Procurement Services, Inc. (IMPS), is a company representing United States pro-
ducers of sports and leisure equipment and services in the Middle East, Europe, the
Far East, and Australia. See Export Trade Certificate of Review for Int'l Mktg. &
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of nonexclusive agreements with United States suppliers and buyers in
the export markets to act as a sales representative 173 or broker. 17 4 A
company may enter into such agreements with suppliers whether or
not the suppliers produce or sell similar equipment and services. 75 A
company also may enter into agreements to serve as the exclusive sales
representative and may agree not to represent any competitors of the
supplier unless authorized by the supplier.' 76 In return, the supplier
agrees not to sell through any other intermediary, directly or indi-
rectly, in the export markets in which the company exclusively repre-
Procurement Servs., Inc. (IMPS), Applic. No. 83-00002, at 3 (Oct. 25, 1983). Al-
though there would seem to be little antitrust concern raised by IMPS' export
conduct, IMPS' attorney stated that having its conduct certified has definitely
changed the way IMPS does business abroad. Sylvester, supra note 132, at 8, col. 2.
Similarly, a company now is permitted to sell groups of products together in what
previously has been regarded as a tying arrangement. See Export Trade Certificate of
Review for Texas First Intercontinental Trading Co., Applic. No. 83-00019, at 4
(Dec. 7, 1983). A tying arrangement is defined as an arrangement that predicates the
sale of one product on the sale of another. P. Areeda, supra note 144, at 732. Such
arrangements can violate § 1 and § 2 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 733.
173. Export Trade Certificate of Review for TWP Co., Inc., Applic. No. 83-
00030, at 3 (Feb. 8, 1984) ("an intermediary who represents a Supplier of Products in
the Export Markets and who, in so acting, offers, provides or engages in some or all
of the Related Services"); Export Trade Certificate of Review for Trade Dev. Corp.
of Chicago (TDCC), Applic. No. 83-00012, at 4 (Nov. 23, 1983) ("an intermediary
who represents a Supplier of Products and Services in the Export Markets and who,
in so acting, offers, provides or engages in some or all Export Trade Services");
Export Trade Certificate of Review for Int'l Mktg. & Procurement Servs., Inc.
(IMPS), Applic. No. 83-00002, at 2 (Oct. 25, 1983) ("an intermediary who represents
the Supplier in the Export Markets and who, in so acting, offers, provides or engages
in some or all Export Trade Services").
174. Export Trade Certificate of Review for TWP Co., Inc., Applic. No. 83-
00030, at 3 (Feb. 8, 1984) ("an intermediary who represents a Supplier of Products in
the Export Markets and who, in so acting, offers, provides or engages in some or all
of the Related Services"); Export Trade Certificate of Review for Trade Dev. Corp.
of Chicago (TDCC), Applic. No. 83-00012, at 4 (Nov. 23, 1983) ("an intermediary
who locates buyers of Products and Services in the Export Markets for Suppliers or
who locates Suppliers of Products and Services for buyers in the Export Markets on a
straight commission or cost-plus commission basis and who, in so acting, offers,
provides or engages in some or all Export Trade Services"): Export Trade Certificate
of Review for Int'l Mktg. & Procurement Servs., Inc. (IMPS) Applic. No. 83-00002,
at 2 (Oct. 25, 1983) "[a]n intermediary who locates buyers in the Export Markets for
the Supplier or who locates Suppliers of Sports and Leisure Equipment and Services
for buyers in the Export Markets on a straight commission or cost-plus commission
basis and who, in so acting, offers, provides or engages in some or all Export Trade
Services").
175. Export Trade Certificate of Review for Int'l Mktg. & Procurement Servs.,
Inc. (IMPS), Applic. No. 83-00002, at 2 (Oct. 25, 1983).
176. Id. at 3.
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sents the supplier. 77 If such sales do occur, the supplier agrees to pay a
commission. 1 78
It is very important for exporters who are not exporting under title
III certification to analyze the manner in which the Commerce De-
partment has addressed the problem of foreclosure. 179 The certificates
rely heavily on the use of restrictive provisions such as a time limita-
tion, limitations on market share, or the establishment of a minimum
number of firms that must be included in the export venture to limit
the risk of foreclosure. Export arrangements that are similar to those
described in the certificates may meet the jurisdictional threshold of
title IV and may constitute antitrust violations because of the absence
of statutory safeguards.
CONCLUSION
For decades, American businesses have asserted that United States
antitrust laws hinder their ability to compete with foreign competitors
in international markets. In the Export Trading Company Act, Con-
gress attempted to clarify the antitrust liability of United States ex-
porters in two ways. First, title IV clarifies the jurisdictional scope of
the antitrust laws. Second, title III authorizes the granting of limited
antitrust immunity for specified export conduct. The goal of both title
III and title IV is the same-to increase United States exports. The
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. The export conduct certified thus far under title III crosses the entire spec-
trum of activities that pose the threat of foreclosure: allocations of markets,
territories and customers, Export Trade Certificate of Review for TWP, Co., Inc.,
Applic. No. 83-00030, at 2-3 (Feb. 8, 1984); exclusive sales or marketing agreements,
Export Trade Certificate of Review for Texas First Intercontinental Trading Co.,
Applic. No. 83-00019, at 4 (Dec. 7, 1983); refusals to deal, Export Trade Certificate
of Review for Universal Trading Group Ltd. (UTG), Applic. No. 83-00005, at 3
(Nov. 28, 1983); exclusive foreign distributorship and marketing arrangements, Ex-
port Trade Certificate of Review for Int'l Trailer Sales, Inc. (ITS), Applic. No. 83-
00009, at 2 (Nov. 15, 1983); agreements on price-fixing and resale price mainte-
nance, Export Trade Certificate of Review for U.S. Farm-Raised Fish Trading Co.,
Inc. (Catfish), Applic. No. 83-00004, at 1-2 (Oct. 25, 1983); horizontal and vertical
integration agreements, id. at 2; tying and requirements contracts, Export Trade
Certificate of Review for Texas First Intercontinental Trading Co., Applic. No. 83-
00019, at 4 (Dec. 7, 1983); and restrictions on membership, Export Trade Certificate
of Review for Intex Int'l Trading Co., Inc., Applic. No. 83-00008, at 2-3 (Oct. 25,
1983). Such export activities engaged in without title III certificates make it difficult
to determine when an export joint venture is lawful. "The ultimate legal result
continues to turn on judicial characterization of a complex factual transaction, a
situation that leads to uncertainty and costly proceedings." Brodley, supra note 63, at
1536.
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antitrust immunity for specified export conduct. The goal of both title
III and title IV is the same-to increase United States exports. The
antitrust concern under both titles is also identical-to prevent a
direct, substantial and foreseeable anticompetitive effect on United
States commerce and United States competitors.
Title III certification permits exporters to structure their export
conduct with certainty. The certificates also provide a valuable guide
to non-certified exporters in identifying current antitrust concerns.
Two such concerns on which the certificates focus are spillover and
foreclosure. The certificates lessen the spillover threat from an ex-
change of business information among export competitors by delineat-
ing the specific exchange permitted, and the certificates ensure that
conduct permitted does not substantially foreclose the export opportu-
nities of domestic competitors. Finally, the certificates successfully
balance protection of domestic commerce and domestic competitors
against facilitation of American export trade.
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